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Abstract
High capital spending is favored by economists and politicians for its benecial eects on
economic growth. However, there is empirical research associating high levels of public in-
vestment with low economic growth due to corruption. I provide an endogenous growth
model with Ramsey taxation that is consistent with this empirical nding. In the model,
government maximizes the weighted average of consumers' utility and its own utility coming
from expropriation of tax revenues. The weight determines the benevolence of the govern-
ment. I show that a self-interested government sets a higher public-to-private-capital ratio
than a benevolent one, reducing the productivity of public capital, in order to use more of the
tax revenues for its own consumption. While a large public-to-private capital ratio increases
the productivity of private investment, high taxes that come along with high public capital
spending reduce the after-tax returns to private investment, causing the growth rate to be
low.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between political corruption and public investment,
and how economic growth in the long run is aected by this relationship. Political corrup-
tion, as dened by Transparency International, is the abuse of entrusted power by political
leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or wealth. Given this deni-
tion, a benevolent government, whose sole purpose is to promote consumers' welfare, would
never engage in corrupt activities. Hence, it is important to relax the assumption of a
benevolent government in order to understand the link between political corruption, public
investment, and economic growth. To this end, I build an endogenous growth model with a
non-benevolent government, which decides on how much public capital to provide. Public
capital, which aects the productivity of private capital, is nanced through income taxes.
The government chooses how much of the tax revenues to spend on public investment and
how much to expropriate for its own consumption. The government maximizes a weighted
average of consumers' welfare and its own welfare coming from expropriated tax revenues.
The weight on consumers' welfare determines how benevolent the government is. If the
weight on consumers' welfare is zero, then the government is totally self-interested, and if
the weight is one then the government is totally benevolent. The weight can be any number
between 0 and 1, implying that the government can be partially benevolent.
In equilibrium, government policies and the best response of private agents to those
policies are determined, and they all depend on how benevolent the government is. Compared
to a benevolent government, a self-interested government chooses a higher public-to-private
capital ratio, which in turn implies higher tax rates, lower productive public investment
spending, higher expropriation of tax revenues, lower private investment, and lower economic
growth.
The government is assumed to be constrained by a period-by-period budget, which implies
an upper bound on total embezzlement by the government in any period. This results in a
dilemma for the corrupt politicians: they can either steal as much as they can in any period,
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leaving only a small amount of funds for the nancing of the public capital, or they can invest
in public capital so as to increase the productivity of private capital, and hence income, in
the future. Increased income implies higher income tax revenues and more funds to embezzle
in the future. Therefore, each type of government chooses an optimal growth rate through
its policies that balances the cost of deferring expropriation of funds today and the benet
of increased tax revenues that can be embezzled in the future. This optimal growth rate is
determined by the public-to-private capital ratio. I argue that a self-interested government
chooses a higher public-to-private-capital ratio than a benevolent government, and that this
results in lower economic growth in the long run.
Some implications of the model can be tested against the data. This exercise requires cer-
tain parameters and variables of the model to be interpreted in a way that allows comparison
with observed and recorded data. For example, the degree of benevolence of the government
in the model is interpreted as the degree of the lack of corruption in that country. Hence, a
self-interested government in the model corresponds to a highly corrupt government in the
data. A similar re-interpretation is needed for public investment. While the model distin-
guishes between productive public investment and expropriated tax revenues, it is hard to
do so in the data. Expropriated tax revenues are recorded as part of government budget
and aect several entries in the government budget. However, authors such as Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007) claim that most of the corrupt activities of
governments are recorded as public investment. In accordance with these studies, expropri-
ated tax revenues will be treated as part of public investment, and the model will predict
high levels of total public investment in countries with high corruption. This prediction is
consistent with the aforementioned papers.
1.1 Background and Related Literature
There is a large literature studying the eects of public spending on economic growth.
Starting with Barro (1990), many theoretical papers introduce public capital into the pro-
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duction function to understand how much it would aect long-run growth. See Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) for a review of the early literature. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) specif-
ically focus on infrastructure investment; while Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) and Eicher
and Turnovsky (2000) take a further step and look at the role of congestion of public capi-
tal. Most of the early theoretical literature is motivated by the empirical work of Aschauer
(1989), among others, arguing that public investment has a substantial positive eect on
growth. See Munnell (1992) for a review of the empirical literature. However, not all empir-
ical papers agree with this claim. For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) emphasize the
importance of distinguishing between dierent types of public spending. Devarajan, Swa-
roop, and Zou (1996) make the distinction between capital and current spending. They nd
that current expenditure has a positive eect on economic growth, whereas capital spending
of governments has a negative eect on growth. They argue that developing countries have
over-invested in public capital at the expense of current spending. While the ndings of
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) support this view, Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007) nd the
opposite results. Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) dierentiate between productive and
non-productive public spending and nd that while the former enhances growth, the latter
does not. They also show that distortionary taxes decrease economic growth.
On the theory front, Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) provide a framework in which they dis-
tinguish between government consumption and government infrastructure investment, and
show why the two would have dierent eects on economic growth. In their theoretical work,
Park and Philippopoulos (2003) distinguish between productive and non-productive govern-
ment spending and include redistributive transfers in their analysis. Recently, Economides,
Park, and Philippopoulos (2011) add to this literature by dierentiating between productive
and non-productive public spending and showing how important congestion is on the deter-
mination of optimal government policy. They independently develop a model very similar to
the one presented in this paper. They consider the case of a benevolent government deciding
how to allocate tax revenues between productivity-enhancing and utility-enhancing public
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spending. In their case, consumers maximize a weighted average of utility from private con-
sumption and utility from public goods. The main focus of their paper is characterizing
the optimal scal policy when dierent types of public goods are subject to dierent de-
grees of congestion. In contrast, I consider a non-benevolent government deciding how much
tax revenues to expropriate while providing productive public capital that ensures sustained
economic growth, and hence, sustained source of corruption in the form of tax revenues.
This paper contributes to the literature on public spending and economic growth by intro-
ducing corruption as a reason why dierent governments choose varying levels of productive
public goods and wasteful spending that does not benet private agents. The literature re-
viewed above ignores the eect of corruption on public investment, which is explored mainly
in empirical papers. For example, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) maintain that corrupt govern-
ments choose high levels of public investment as a share of aggregate income. They claim
that political corruption is often tied to capital projects. This is because the decisions re-
garding the budget and composition of capital are highly discretionary. Lack of competition
in undertaking big capital projects and the diculty in assessing the real cost and value of
these projects make them suitable for corruption. The authors also argue that corruption
reduces the productivity of public capital. Similarly, Keefer and Knack (2007) show that
recorded levels of public investment are higher in corrupt countries. The model developed
in this paper brings together these two strands of literature, and allows for the empirical
results related to corruption and public investment to be tied to the theoretical insights from
endogenous growth models.
There is also a large literature studying the direct relationship between corruption and
economic growth, starting with Mauro (1995). Many authors conclude that corruption leads
to lower economic growth (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Mauro (1997)). The contribution
of the paper to this literature is to provide a theoretical framework, which focuses on public
investment as the economic mechanism through which corruption aects growth.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt to explain the relationship
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between political corruption, public investment, and economic growth through a model that
analyzes the behavior of dierent types of government. Haque and Kneller (2008) also analyze
the link between these three variables, and they document the empirical relationship. They
nd that corruption raises the level of public investment but lowers the returns to it, making
it ineective in promoting economic growth. Their empirical ndings are consistent with the
results of my model.
This paper essentially brings together three strands of literature on public investment
and growth, public investment and corruption, and corruption and growth. Most of the
work done especially in the last two literatures is empirical and lacks a theoretical basis.
This paper lls this theoretical gap in the literature.
1.2 The Road Map
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: I rst set up the model and characterize
the competitive equilibrium in Section 2. I then use the concept of Ramsey equilibrium to
endogenize the policy choices of the government. After characterizing the balanced growth
path outcomes, I move on to discussing the empirical implications of the model in Section
3. In Section 4, I describe the data used to test the empirical implications and show very
basic relationships between the variables of interest. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
In order to study the relationship between public investment and economic growth, I
will use an endogenous growth model with public capital. The model is based on Barro
(1990). There are a continuum of identical innitely-lived individuals and a government.
Each individual is born with an initial capital endowment of k0. To keep the model simple,
it is assumed that there is no labor market. There is a single nonstorable consumption good
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which is valued by the consumers. The representative individual maximizes her present
discounted utility from consumption, where the discount rate  2 (0; 1):
1X
t=0
tu(ct) (1)
Individuals rent capital, k, to rms and earn capital income at rate r, and pay income
taxes at rate  to the government. Therefore, their budget constraint is:
ct + kt+1   (1  k)kt = (1  t)rtkt 8t (2)
where k is the depreciation rate for private capital. Hence, given the representative individ-
ual's initial capital endowment, k0, the sequence of rates of return to private capital, frtg10 ,
and the sequence of tax rates, ftg10 , the representative consumer's problem can be written
as maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (2).
There are two factors of production in this economy: private capital and public capital.
Each rm produces output, yt, according to the following technology:
yt = f(kt; gt) = Akt(
gt
Kt
) 8t (3)
where A > 0, 0 <  < 1, gt is the public capital stock, and Kt is the aggregate private
capital stock. Individual private capital stock k and aggregate private capital stock K are
dierentiated to capture the eect of congestion on the marginal productivity of private
capital. As the aggregate capital stock increases, public capital available per unit of private
capital decreases, thereby reducing the marginal productivity of private capital. As argued
in Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992), this functional form of production function corresponds
to the case when public goods are rival but not excludable. According to these authors,
this type of public goods includes highways, water and sewer systems, airports and harbors,
courts, and even national defense and police.
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Note that this production function implies constant returns to private capital as long as
the government maintains a constant congestion of public services, i.e. a constant g
K
ratio.
However, the aggregate production function Yt = AKt(
gt
Kt
) exhibits diminishing returns to
aggregate private capital K for given public capital stock g, and this is due to congestion.1
The government is allowed to be non-benevolent and is assumed to maximize a weighted
average of consumers' welfare and the utility it gets from expropriated resources:
1X
t=0
tf(1  )u(Ct) + v(Et)g (4)
where  2 [0; 1] is the type of the government, and E is the expropriation by the government.
Here  denotes the degree of government's benevolence. If  = 0, the government is
totally benevolent and maximizes consumers' utility. If  = 1, the government is totally self-
interested and maximizes the amount of resources it can divert from productive uses. The
parameter  is allowed to take on any value between 0 and 1, implying that the government
can be partially benevolent. The type of the government is determined exogenously and
does not change over time.
In reality, the degree of benevolence of a government can depend on many institutional,
sociological, historical, and economic factors. Studying these factors is outside the scope
of this paper, and hence, the type of the government will be treated as exogenous. Indices
measuring the extent of corruption show that there is persistence in the extent of corruption
over time.2 Corrupt countries tend to stay corrupt. Similarly, clean economies persistently
stay free of corruption.3 Hence,  for any country will be taken as constant over time.
The government levies distortionary income taxes to nance public investment, but it
can expropriate part of the tax revenues for its own consumption. Hence, the government
1See Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000), Economides, Park, and Philippopoulos
(2011) for detailed analyses of how congestion aects policy choices and equilibrium outcomes.
2For example, Corruption Perceptions Index values in 1995 and 2006 have a correlation coecient of
0.93.
3See Mauro (2004) for two models with multiple equilibria that explain the persistence phenomena and
its eects on economic growth.
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budget constraint at any time t can be written as:
Et + gt+1   (1  g)gt = trtKt (5)
where g is the depreciation rate of public capital. It is assumed that the government has a
technology that converts tax revenues into public good. Also, it is assumed that gt+1  0 in
every period. This implies that the maximum amount that can be expropriated at any time
t equals total tax revenues at that period plus existing public capital net of depreciation.
A government policy is dened as a sequence of tax rates, public capital levels, and
amount of expropriation for all t  0. It is denoted by  = ft; gt+1; Etg1t=0.
Finally, feasible allocations are described by the resource constraint:
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

(6)
where C is the aggregate consumption spending in the economy.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium describes the choices of consumers and rms as best response
to government policies.
Denition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) For a given government policy  =
ft; gt+1; Etgt0, and initial public and private capital stocks, g0 and k0, competitive equi-
librium for this economy is an allocation fct; kt+1; Ct; Kt+1gt0, and a price frtgt0 such
that:
1. Given prices and policy, the allocation solves the consumer's maximization problem.
2. Price satises rt = fkt = A(
gt
Kt
), 8t.
3. Government budget constraint (5) holds.
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4. Resource constraint (6) is satised.
2.2.1 Characterizing Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium can be characterized by a set of seven equations. See Ap-
pendix A for details. The following two propositions simplify the characterization of com-
petitive equilibrium by reducing it down to two equations. These propositions will be used
in the next section to describe Ramsey equilibrium allocations.
Proposition 1 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium satisfy the following:
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

(7)
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] (8)
Proof. Constraint See Appendix B.
Equation (8) summarizes the best response of consumers and rms to government's
choices and describes the conditions under which government policies can be implemented.
Proposition 2 Given allocations and period-0 policies that satisfy (7) and (8), one can
construct policies and prices which, together with the given allocations and period-0 policies,
constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
2.3 Ramsey Equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium allocations describe the behavior of private agents given gov-
ernment policy. However, government policies need to be endogenized. To that end, the
setup of the model will be reinterpreted as a game, and additional assumptions regarding
the timing of the game will be made. It will be assumed that the government moves rst
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at time 0 and sets the stream of future policies for all time t  0. Consumers make their
decisions after they observe the government policy. This timing assumption implies that the
government can fully commit to its policies at the beginning of the game and cannot change
its actions after consumers have made their savings decisions.4 The equilibrium notion used
in this case is called Ramsey equilibrium.
Denition 2 (Ramsey Equilibrium) Given initial capital stocks, g0 and K0, a Ram-
sey equilibrium is a government policy  = f t ; gt+1; Et gt0, an allocation rule
fCt(); Kt+1()gt0, and a price function frt()gt0 such that:
1. Government policy  solves:
max

1X
t=0
tf(1  )u(Ct()) + v(Et)g
subject to
Et + gt+1   (1  g)gt = trt()Kt()
2. For every policy  2 , the allocations C() and K(), and the price system r()
constitute a competitive equilibrium.
The resulting allocations in Ramsey equilibrium are called Ramsey allocations, and the
resulting policies are called Ramsey policies. Propositions 1 and 2 will be used to characterize
the Ramsey equilibrium.
4Commitment implies either institutional or reputational restrictions on government policy. One can
argue that corrupt governments would not be restricted by reputational concerns, and institutions would be
weak if corrupt governments are in power. This implies that government policies may be time-inconsistent
in that the government may choose to levy higher taxes after the consumers make their savings decisions.
This is a valid criticism. Extension of the model to an environment without commitment is left for future
research. See Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte, and Soares (2003) for the role commitment plays when a benevolent
government nances public investment through income taxes.
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2.3.1 Characterizing Ramsey Equilibrium
In order to characterize the Ramsey Equilibrium, I will set up a Ramsey Problem,
following Chari and Kehoe (1999). Proposition 3 extends the results of Chari and Kehoe
(1999) to the case with a non-benevolent government.
Ramsey Problem with a Non-Benevolent Government:
max
Ct;Kt+1;Et;gt+1
1X
t=0
tf(1  )u(Ct) + v(Et)g
subject to
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

(9)
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] (10)
Proposition 3 Ramsey allocations and policies solve the Ramsey Problem with a non-
benevolent government.
Proof. This is a corollary of Propositions 1 and 2. Also see Chari and Kehoe (1999).
The Ramsey equilibrium can be characterized by a set of six equations, which describe
the optimal behavior of the government and consumers at all time periods. See Appendix A
for details.
2.4 Balanced Growth Path
The main focus of the paper is long-run growth, so the balanced growth path will be
analyzed.5 On a balanced growth path, the following ratios must be constant: Ct+1
Ct
= C ,
Et+1
Et
= E,
Kt+1
Kt
= K , and
gt+1
gt
= g for all t.
5For the dynamic analysis of an endogenous growth model with public capital, see Futagami, Morita,
and Shibata (1993).
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Assuming u() = log() and v() = log(), the balanced growth path can be characterized
analytically.
Proposition 4 Given initial private and public capital stocks, K0 and g0, the balanced
growth path is characterized by the following conditions:
 C
K
= (1  )[1  g + A( g
K
) 1]
 E
K
= A(
g
K
)   ( 1

+
g
K
)[1  g + A( g
K
) 1] + (1  k) + (1  g) g
K
  = 1  [1  g + A(
g
K
) 1]  (1  k)
A( g
K
)
 C = K = E = g =   [1  g + A( g
K
) 1]
where g
K
satises:
(1 )A( g
K
) ( 1

+
g
K
)[1 g+A( g
K
) 1]+(1 k)+(1 g) g
K
	 (1 )[1 g+A( g
K
) 1] =
[k   g + A( g
K
) 1   A(1  )( g
K
)]
Proof. See Appendix B.
The key ratio for the balanced growth path is the public-to-private capital ratio, g
K
; all
other variables are determined according to this ratio. Notice that this ratio depends on a
number of things, including the depreciation rates of public capital and private capital (g
and k), rate of time preference of the consumers and the government (), public capital
elasticity of output (), and the type of the government (). Given the value of g
K
, the
consumption-private capital ratio and the expropriation-private capital ratio stay constant.
Remark 1 On a balanced growth path, public-to-private capital ratio g
K
and economic growth
rate are inversely related.
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Figure 1: Growth and gK . Parameter values are A =
1
3 ,  = 0:25,  = 0:9, and k = g = 0:07.
This remark might seem counter-intuitive at rst. After all, public investment provides
infrastructure to private capital, rendering it more productive. The eect of public capital
on private capital is indeed positive in competitive equilibrium, when the growth rate is
given by:
CE = [1  k + (1  )A( g
K
)] (11)
In this case, the partial derivative of CE is (1  )A( g
K
) 1 > 0. So, in a competitive
equilibrium, the higher g
K
, the higher the growth rate. Note that, in a competitive equilib-
rium, taxes are taken as given by consumers and rms. In Ramsey equilibrium, however,
taxes are not constant, and they depend on g
K
. The more public capital provided, the higher
the taxes. While higher public capital is benecial for economic growth, higher taxes have
the opposite eect. Remark 1 implies that in Ramsey equilibrium, the increase in  more
than osets the increase in g
K
, and the growth rate decreases as a result.
For the rest of the results, I will rst assume full depreciation, which simplies the
characterization of Ramsey equilibrium and allows for a clear exposition of the results. I will
then show the more general case, with less than full depreciation.
Case 1 (Full Depreciation) Assume g = k = 1.
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In this case the equation determining g
K
simplies signicantly:
g
K
=

(1  )(1  ) + (1  ) (12)
Proposition 5 A self-interested government sets a higher public-to-private capital ratio than
a benevolent government does, for all  < 1, under full depreciation.
Proof. From equation (12), if the government is benevolent, i.e.  = 0, it chooses:
(
g
K
)BEN =

(1  ) (13)
If the government is self-interested, i.e.  = 1, it chooses:
(
g
K
)SELF INT =

(1  ) (14)
For  < 1, (1  ) > (1  ). Hence, 
(1 ) <

(1 ) .
Proposition 5 is the key result of the paper, and it requires an intuitive explanation. A
close look at the production function shows that higher public capital always increases the
amount of production; however, the eect of public capital on production depends on the
public-to-private capital ratio. At the aggregate level, the production function is given by:
Yt = AKt(
gt
Kt
) (15)
Hence, @Yt
@gt
= A( gt
Kt
) 1, and the higher gt
Kt
, the lower the marginal product of public
capital, since 0 <  < 1.
If the marginal product of public capital is high, then marginal returns to investing
in public capital is high, and the government has more incentives to use tax revenues for
public investment rather than embezzling them. Therefore, a self-interested government,
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which prefers expropriation of funds to investing them would rather have the productivity of
public capital low. The self-interested government can make public capital less productive by
keeping the public-to-private capital ratio high. This is why g=K is ineciently high when
the government is self interested. This explanation is consistent with the empirical work
of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), asserting that corruption reduces the productivity of public
capital. Proposition 5 could also explain why developing countries, many of which suer
from high levels of corruption, have over-invested in public capital, as Devarajan, Swaroop,
and Zou (1996) argue.
Another point worth mentioning is why the benevolent government chooses g
K
= 
1  .
Readers familiar with the literature would recall that many endogenous growth models with
public investment, starting with Barro (1990), nd the optimal public investment-to-private
capital ratio to be equal to the ratio of output elasticities of the two inputs, i.e. 
1  . However,
in the case of a benevolent government in this model, the optimal choice of the government
is smaller than 
1  . This is because in this model, unlike Barro (1990) and others, public
investment is taken as a stock variable rather than a ow variable, and the government policy
involves choosing next period's capital level rather than current investment. In the case of
full depreciation, this means that in every period t, the government is choosing gt+1
Kt+1
rather
than gt
Kt
. Hence, Barro (1990)'s golden rule is discounted by the rate of time preference of
the government and consumers.
Proposition 6 When public capital and private capital fully depreciate
(a) all types of governments set the same public investment share of output.
(b) the less benevolent a government, the higher the total public spending.
(c) the less benevolent a government, the higher the tax rate.
Proof. (a) Dene public investment as igt = gt+1   (1  g)gt, 8t. It is shown in Appendix
B that on the balanced growth path with full depreciation:
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ig
Y
=  (16)
Notice that this value does not depend on , so all types of governments choose the same
share of public investment.
(b) Dene total public spending as igt + Et, 8t. It is shown in Appendix B that on the
balanced growth path with full depreciation:
ig + E
Y
=  + (1  ) (17)
Hence, a bigger  implies a larger total public spending. Given the government's bud-
get constraint, this result implies that tax revenues are also higher when the government is
corrupt. Note that this is not consistent with stylized facts provided by Tanzi and Davoodi
(1997). However, this is to be expected, because the model does not incorporate any mech-
anism for tax payers to avoid paying taxes. In corrupt countries, tax revenues are usually
low because of tax evasion, improper tax exemptions, and weak tax administration (Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997)).
(c) Now consider the tax rate. It is shown in Appendix B that on the balanced growth
path with full depreciation:
 =  + (1  ) (18)
When the government is benevolent ( = 0):
BEN =  (19)
When the government is totally self-interested, ( = 1):
SELF INT = 1   +  (20)
Notice that when the government is totally benevolent, all of the tax revenues are used
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for nancing the productive portion of public investment. A self-interested government, on
the other hand, uses only part of the tax revenues for the same amount of productive public
investment. Another point to mention is that an impatient government expropriates more
than a patient one. In other words,
@(E
Y
)
@
< 0. With a low , an impatient government does
not wait for the tax base to increase over time with the growth rate.
Proposition 7 When public and private capital fully depreciate
(a) the less benevolent a government, the lower the private investment.
(b) the less benevolent a government, the lower the growth rate.
Proof. (a) Dene aggregate private investment as it = Kt+1   (1   k)Kt, 8t. It is shown
in Appendix B that on the balanced growth path with full depreciation:
ik
Y
= [(1  )(1  ) + (1  )] (21)
Given equation (21),
@(ik=Y )
@
=  (1  ) < 0.
(b) Using Proposition 4 and equation (12), growth rate can be found as:
 = A[(1  )(1  ) + (1  )]1  (22)
Given the restrictions on all the parameters, the growth rate decreases with .
Case 2 (Less Than Full Depreciation) Assume 0 < g < 1, 0 < k < 1.
In this case, there is no way to simplify the formulas presented above. However, it is
still possible to see how a benevolent government diers from a self-interested one. Table 1
shows how the values of the variables change with the degree of government's benevolence.
These numbers are calculated for A = 1
3
,  = 0:9,  = 0:25, k = 0:07, and g = 0:07.
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Table 1: Balanced Growth Path Values
 0 0.10 0.25 0.50
g=K 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.40
g=Y 1.17 1.22 1.32 1.52
K=Y 4.12 4.05 3.95 3.77
ig=Y 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08
E=Y 0 0.06 0.15 0.30
 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.38
ik=Y 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.21
Growth Rate 3% 2.1% 1% -1.5%
In this case, productive portion of public spending is no longer the same across dierent
types of government. The less benevolent a government, the less productive public invest-
ment spending. The other variables are related to  in the same way they were in the case
of full depreciation.
3 Empirical Implications of the Model
Some of the empirical implications of the model are already tested against the data by
other researchers. For example, the implication that corrupt countries would have low growth
rates has been demonstrated by Mauro (1995), among others.
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Figure 2: Total Public-to-private Investment Ratio and Growth. Parameter values same as in Figure 1.
Other implications of the model are not documented. The model predicts that countries
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with high total public-to-private ratio would have low economic growth (see Figure 2). The
model also implies that productive public investment and expropriated tax revenues are
inversely correlated (see Figure 3). A benevolent government would choose a high productive
public investment share of output and would not embezzle resources for its own use. A self-
interested government, on the other hand, would choose a lower productive public investment
and use a large part of tax revenues for non-productive purposes. This means that if the
total public investment observed is high, then it is likely that most of this public investment
is non-productive, aimed at providing private returns for politicians. Figure 4 depicts this
relationship.
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Figure 3: Productive Public Investment and Expro-
priated Resources as a Share of Output. Parameter
values same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Total Public Investment Share of Output
and Expropriated Resources as a Share of Output. Pa-
rameter values same as in Figure 1.
Finally, the model predicts that corrupt governments would set higher taxes, which cause
economic growth rates to suer.
My aim in the next section is to show that the untested implications of the model are
consistent with the data. Rigorous empirical work studying the eect of corruption on public-
to-private investment ratio and the eect of this ratio on economic growth is left for future
research.
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4 Data
The key variable in the model is the public-to-private capital ratio. However, public
capital stock and private capital stock are not available for most countries. As a proxy to
g=K, I use the public-to-private investment ratio. To calculate this ratio, I use the public
investment and private investment shares of GDP for various countries reported by Everhart
and Sumlinski (2001). In addition, I use the Easterly (2001) data set and OECD data to
ll in the data for additional countries. These data sets cover a wide range of countries over
1970-2000. Since the focus of this paper is on the long-run, I take the average of public and
private investment shares of output for each country during that period.
I use Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) data for annual growth rates in real GDP per
capita (in 2000 constant prices) between 1970-2000. I calculate the average annual growth
rate during that period for each country. The measure of corruption I use is Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2000.6 The CPI ranks countries by
their perceived levels of public sector corruption, as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with ten indicating a highly
clean country and zero indicating a highly corrupt country. While CPI data is available
starting from 1994, CPI values are not comparable across time. Hence, rather than taking
the average CPI values for between 1994-2000, I only look at the CPI values for 2000. Earlier
years include fewer countries.
There are 64 countries in the whole sample.7 The complete list of countries included is
6The methodology of corruption indices, what they exactly measure, and their use in empirical work
have received criticism in the literature. See Knack (2007) for a review of problems associated with measures
of corruption. However, many authors working on corruption have used them to measure dierent aspects
of corruption. For example, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) use the corruption index of the International
Country Risk Guide to measure the weight politicians put on the bribes they receive relative to social welfare.
Mauro (1998), on the other hand, uses the same index to measure the extent of lucrative opportunities public
spending on education provides to government ocials. In this paper, I use CPI to measure the weight
politicians put on their own welfare relative to the welfare of the consumers.
7In an earlier version of the paper, I used the data set of Easterly and Rebelo (1993). That data set
covered only the period 1970-1998, and it included 86 countries. The countries included in that data set are
signicantly dierent than the ones covered in the data set I use in this version. However, the results are
very similar for both data sets, which reinforces the validity of the results.
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in Appendix C. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Whole Sample (64 Countries)
Public Investment Share (%) 6.51 3.92 1.75 19.56
Private Investment Share (%) 16.18 5.68 4.16 27.25
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.64 0.60 0.09 3.30
Growth Rate (%) 1.92 1.71 -3.73 7.28
2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 5.09 2.48 1.20 10
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%) 3.57 1.86 0.50 8.10
Advanced Countriesa (24 Countries)
Public Investment Share (%) 3.24 0.89 1.75 5.42
Private Investment Share (%) 21.35 3.02 16.10 27.25
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.64
Growth Rate (%) 2.40 1.14 0.13 6.32
2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 7.70 1.71 4 10
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%) 2.57 1.57 0.50 7.42
Developing Countriesa (40 Countries)
Public Investment Share (%) 8.47 3.72 2.37 19.56
Private Investment Share (%) 13.8 4.52 4.16 26.82
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.91 0.61 0.17 3.30
Growth Rate (%) 1.63 1.93 -3.73 7.28
2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 3.53 1.24 1.20 7.40
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%) 4.25 1.75 0.63 8.10
Least Corrupt Countriesb (11 Countries)
Public Investment Share (%) 3.14 0.69 1.75 4.08
Private Investment Share (%) 20.32 3.06 16.10 26.25
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.25
Growth Rate (%) 2.20 0.77 1.09 3.56
2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 9.16 0.46 8.60 10.00
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%) 2.45 1.86 0.50 7.42
Most Corrupt Countriesb (11 Countries)
Public Investment Share (%) 8.24 4.28 3.50 19.56
Private Investment Share (%) 12.90 5.46 6.49 26.82
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.89 0.48 0.17 1.93
Growth Rate (%) 0.97 1.45 -1.04 3.93
2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 2.17 0.52 1.20 2.70
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%) 4.72 2.50 0.63 8.10
aAccording to the classication of the IMF. See Appendix C for the list of advanced
countries.
bTop and bottom 11 countries according to the Corruption Perceptions Index (2000).
See Appendix C for the list of these countries.
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To test the key implication of the model, I look at the correlation between corruption and
public-to-private investment ratio. For ease of exposition, I change the measure of corruption
to 10   CPI, so that higher values of the corruption measure correspond to high levels of
corruption. As Figure 5 shows, corruption and the public-to-private investment ratio are
positively related. Since g
K
is a measure of congestion in the model, this result can also be
interpreted as congestion being lower in countries with corrupt governments.
Figure 5: Public-to-private Investment Ratio and Corruption in the data.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the public-to-private investment ratio and the
growth rate.
Figure 7 depicts the relationship between corruption and public investment share of
output. This positive relationship is in line with the model's results. Corrupt governments
inate the amount of public investment by reducing the productive public investment and
increasing the amount of funds expropriated. Keefer and Knack (2007) nd a similar result
and claim that public investment reported should not be used for policy suggestions because
the reported public investment data is an overestimation of the actual productive public
investment.
To test the implications of the model regarding tax rates, I use the top marginal tax
rate data from Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson (2011). This data set reports top marginal tax
23
Figure 6: Public-to-private Investment Ratio and Growth Rate in the data.
Figure 7: Public Investment Share of Output and Corruption in the data.
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rates for every ve years during 1970-2000. I calculate the average marginal tax rate for
each country. Figure 8 demonstrates the positive relationship between corruption and top
marginal tax rate, as implied by the model. The signs of correlation between tax rate and
the other variables are also consistent with the implications of the model.
Figure 8: Top Marginal Tax Rate and Corruption in the data.
Table 3 summarizes the correlation coecients for all the variables. Note that all coef-
cients are statistically signicant at the 90% condence level except for the ones noted in
the table.
Table 3: Correlation Coecients
Growth Tax
(ig + E)=Y ik=Y g=K Rate Corruption Rate
(ig + E)=Y 1
ik=Y -0.52 1
g=K 0.75 -0.70 1
Growth Rate 0.02 0.34 -0.24 1
Corruption 0.54 -0.57 0.51 -0.21@ 1
Tax Rate 0.33 -0.28 0.18+ -0.12 -0.39 1
Not statistically signicant.
@Statistically signicant almost at the 90% condence level.
+Signicant at the 80% condence level.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a theoretical framework to understand the link between public invest-
ment, corruption, and economic growth. The economic mechanism suggested by the model is
that a self-interested government provides an ineciently high level of public capital, which
reduces the productivity of public investment and provides room for corrupt spending by
the government. Low levels of congestion of public capital (high public-to-private capital ra-
tio) increases the productivity of private investment. However, higher taxes that come with
higher public capital levels cause economic growth rate to suer. The model predicts that
corruption comes with high public-to-private capital ratio, high recorded public investment
(which includes corrupt spending), high tax rates, low private investment, and low economic
growth.
An interesting extension of the model would be to consider the case when the government
does not have access to a commitment technology and to compare the results to those of
Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte, and Soares (2003).
Appendix A - Characterization of Equilibria
Characterizing Competitive Equilibrium
Let t be the Lagrange multiplier on the time-t consumer's budget constraint (denoted
Cons-BC below). The following equations characterize the competitive equilibrium:
Cons-BC: Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt = (1  t)rtKt 8t
Cons-Euler: u
0(ct+1)
u0(ct) =
1
(1 t+1)rt+1+1 k 8t
Price: rt = A

gt
Kt

8t
GBC: Et + gt+1   (1  g)gt = trtKt 8t
Feasibility: Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

8t
TVC1: limt!1 tKt = 0
TVC2: limt!1 tgt = 0
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Characterizing Ramsey Equilibrium
Let tt and 
tt be the Lagrange multipliers on equations (9) and (10), respectively.
Then the following equations characterize the Ramsey Equilibrium:
(1  )u0t + t + tu00t   t 1u00t [Ct+Kt+1Kt ]  t 1u0t 1Kt = 0
t   t+1[1  k + A(1  )

gt+1
Kt+1

] + tu
0
t+1[
Ct+1+Kt+2
K2t+1
]  t 1 u
0
t
Kt
= 0
v0t + t = 0
t   t+1[1  g + A

gt+1
Kt+1
 1
] = 0
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

u0(Ct+1)[
Ct+1+Kt+2
Kt+1
] = u0(Ct)
Appendix B - Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst constraint, the feasibility constraint, is part of the denition of CE. The second
one is obtained by plugging GBC, Price, and Feasibility in Cons-Euler.
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[(1  (Et+1 + gt+2   (1  g)gt+1
rr+1Kt+1
))rt+1 + 1  k]
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[A(
gt+1
Kt+1
)   (Et+1 + gt+2   (1  g)gt+1
A( gt+1
Kt+1
)Kt+1
)A(
gt+1
Kt+1
) + 1  k]
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[
A( gt+1
Kt+1
)Kt+1   Et+1   gt+2 + (1  g)gt+1
Kt+1
+ 1  k]
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2   (1  k)Kt+1
Kt+1
+ 1  k]
u0(Ct) = u0(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
]
Proof of Proposition 2
Aggregate allocations fCt; Ktgt0, initial conditions g0 and K0, and rst-period policies g1,
0 and E0 are given. Prices frtg1t=0 and policies ft; Et; gt+1g1t=1 need to be constructed. To
this end rst-order conditions will be used. Given the assumptions on the utility function
of consumers, the rst-order conditions are both necessary and sucient for consumer and
rm maximization.
The following four equations can be used to construct rt, t, Et, and gt+1 at each
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time t:
rt = A

gt
Kt

(23)
t+1 = 1 
"
u0t
u0t+1
  1 + k
#
1
A

gt+1
kt+1
 (24)
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

(25)
gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = A(1  t)Kt

gt
Kt

(26)
Proof of Proposition 4
As shown in Appendix A, Ramsey Problem is characterized by the following equations:
(1  )
Ct
+ t   t
C2t
+
t 1
C2t
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]  t 1
CtKt
= 0 (27)
t   t+1[1  k +A(1  )

gt+1
Kt+1

] + 
t
Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
K2t+1
]  t 1Kt
Ct
= 0 (28)

Et
+ t = 0 (29)
t   t+1[1  g +A

gt+1
Kt+1
 1
] = 0 (30)
Ct +Kt+1   (1  k)Kt + gt+1   (1  g)gt + Et = AKt

gt
Kt

(31)

Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] =
1
Ct
(32)
On a balanced growth path, the following ratios must be constant: Ct+1
Ct
= C ,
Et+1
Et
= E,
Kt+1
Kt
= K , and
gt+1
gt
= g for all t.
Plug (29) in (30):
Et+1
Et
= [1  g + A

gt+1
Kt+1
 1
]
In order for this ratio to be constant over time, gt
Kt
must be constant for all t. Denote this
ratio by X = g
K
. Then:
E = [1  g + AX 1]
Equation (32) on balanced growth path implies:
Ct
Kt
+ K =
C

So Ct
Kt
is a constant for all t, hence C = K . So, on balanced growth path:
C
K
= (
1  

)K (33)
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Rewrite equation (31):
Ct
Kt
+
Kt+1
Kt
  (1  k) + gt+1
Kt
  (1  g) gt
Kt
+
Et
Kt
= A

gt
Kt

On balanced growth path:
(
1  

)K + K   (1  k) +XK   (1  g)X + Et
Kt
= AX
So, Et
Kt
is a constant for all t; hence E = K and:
E
K
= AX   ( 1

+X)K + (1  k) + (1  g)X (34)
Now consider (27). Plug (29) in (27):
(1  )
Ct
  
Et
  t
C2t
+
t 1
C2t
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]  t 1
Ct
1
Kt
= 0
Multiply it by Kt and consider the balanced growth path:
(1  )K
C
  K
E
  tK
CtC
+
t 1K
CtC
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]  t 1
Ct
= 0
Rewrite it:
(1  )K
C
  (1  )K
E
  t
Ct
K
C
+
t 1
Ct 1

K
KC
[
C
K
+ K ]  1
K

= 0 (35)
Now consider (28). Plug (29) and (30) in (28):
 

K   (1  k) + A(1  )

gt+1
Kt+1


Et+1
+
t
Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
K2t+1
]  t 1 1
CtKt
= 0
Multiply by Kt+1 and consider the balanced growth path:
  (K   (1  k) + A(1  )X)) K
E
+
t
KCt
[
C
K
+ K ]  t 1 K
KCt 1
= 0
Rewrite it:
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  (K   (1  k) + A(1  )X) K
E
+
t
Ct

K
[
C
K
+ K ]  t 1
Ct 1
= 0 (36)
(35) and (36) are dierence equations for 
C
. They have to be satised at the same time.
Hence, this condition can be used to nd X. The X that satises both (35) and (36) is given
by:
(1 )K
C
  K
E
K
C
= 
 
[1  g + AX 1]  [1  k + A(1  )X]


K
E
(37)
Once C
K
and E
K
are substituted from equations (33) and (34), one can solve for X using (37).
Now consider the Euler equation from the consumer's problem:
Ct+1
Ct
= [(1  t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
From the government's problem:
Ct+1
Ct
= [1  g + AX 1]
Equating the two:
 = 1  1  g + AX
 1   (1  k)
AX
Then the balanced growth path is characterized by the set of equations provided in Propo-
sition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6
(a) With full depreciation: ig = gt+1. Moreover, following Proposition 4, on the balanced
growth path: gt+1 = gt. Then:
ig
Y
=
g
Y
Using  = A( g
K
) 1 from Proposition 4 and Y = AK( g
K
) from equation (15):
ig
Y
=
A( g
K
) 1g
AK( g
K
)
=  (38)
(b) From equation (15):
K
Y
=
1
A( g
K
)
From Proposition 4:
E
Y
=
E
K
K
Y
= [A(
g
K
)   ( 1

+
g
K
)A(
g
K
) 1]
K
Y
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Plugging in for K=Y :
E
Y
=
E
K
K
Y
= [A(
g
K
)   ( 1

+
g
K
)A(
g
K
) 1]
1
A( g
K
)
Simplies to:
E
Y
= 1  ( 1

+
g
K
)
1
g=K
Plugging in g
K
= 
(1 )(1 )+(1 ) from equation (12), and simplifying:
E
Y
= (1  )
Using equation (38):
ig + E
Y
=  + (1  )
(c) From Proposition 4, with full depreciation:
 = 1  
g=K
Plugging in for g
K
from equation (12) and simplifying:
 = 1  
(1 )(1 )+(1 )
= (1  ) + 
Proof of Proposition 7
(a) With full depreciation: ik = Kt+1. Moreover, following Proposition 4, on the balanced
growth path: Kt+1 = Kt. Then:
ik
Y
=
K
Y
Using  = A( g
K
) 1 from Proposition 4 and Y = AK( g
K
) from equation (15):
ik
Y
=
A( g
K
) 1K
AK( g
K
)
=

g=K
Plugging in g
K
from equation (12), and simplifying:
ik
Y
=


(1 )(1 )+(1 )
= [(1  )(1  ) + (1  )]
(b) Proof provided in the main text.
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Appendix C - Data
List of countries included in the sample
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Advanced countries included in the sample
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Ko-
rea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.
Least corrupt countries included in the sample
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and UK.
Most corrupt countries included in the sample
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Co^te d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda,
Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
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